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Critical Response
II
Talking about My Generation
Ian Hunter
Regardless that he treats my “The History of Theory” essay as exem-
plary of how not to pursue its chosen task, I am appreciative of Fredric
Jameson’s sustained engagement with it, especially where he provides op-
portunities to clarify and extend the arguments (see Ian Hunter, “The
History of Theory,”Critical Inquiry 33 [Autumn 2006]: 78–112). Indeed,
there is even something nostalgic in Jameson’s more extravagant denun-
ciations of the essay and its author when treated as symptomatic of the
antitheory ideology of late capitalist (anti-) intellectual apostasy. This
harks back to a time when academics could accuse each other of being
mouthpieces for forces far more momentous than those that run univer-
sity departments and gatekeep learned journals. I see no reason though to
take these florid denunciations to heart, especially as neither of us works in
circumstances where my putative betrayal could matter to anyone outside
the tiniest and most self-involved of academic groupings. In responding to
Jameson’s remarks my focus thus will be on what I take to be a mischar-
acterization of the central argument of “The History of Theory.” This is his
claim that the essay is an attack on the “idealism” of theory, which, in the
event, is undermined by its own idealism—a work of antitheory that fails
to grasp its own theoretical determinations—as a result of its lack of a
proper (dialectical materialist) conception of history. I shall argue that this
characterization arises as a standard antitype of dialectical philosophical
history: the figure of the intellectual whose relative class autonomy permits
him to think the idealism of bourgeois ideology without realizing the ma-
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terial grounds of his thinking, leaving him in the position of the satirist
satirized. Not only is this analytical figure too rigid to capture the kind of
argument being offered about the history of theory, but it also preempts
the possibility of correcting or falsifying the argument by exposing it to
“further research”—a phrase that Jameson regards as a slightly deluded
appeal to what is in fact a censorious positivism.
Jameson’s view arises from a dialectical philosophical hermeneutics
that regards history as the passage of consciousness towards comprehen-
sion of its own material determination, driven by an inescapable dualism
between ideas and their social production. The kind of historiography that
informs my essay, however, treats thinking itself as an historical activity:
the achievement of an open-ended array of intellectual performances us-
ing a variety of arts of thinking for particular contextual purposes. These
arts are not regarded as opaque to a latent material (economic) determi-
nation whose future revelation gives history its prophetic direction.
Rather, they are treated as instruments for the most diverse array of human
activities— of economic calculation to be sure, but also of erotic intensifi-
cation, juridical regulation, spiritual contemplation, scientific experimen-
tation, political rationalization, aesthetic cultivation, and so on—from
which histories flow as the scarcely foreseeable and largely unintended
outcomes of the activities themselves. The central argument of my essay is
that 1960s humanities theory is one such art of thinking. What Jameson’s
response makes clear is that historical understanding of the 1960s ars theo-
ria is fractured by (at least) two rival historiographies—themselves special
arts of thinking—requiring our discussion to enter the history of histori-
ography.
1
Jameson is right to identify as central to my argument the redescription
of 1960s humanities theory in terms of its deployment of a certain kind of
spiritual exercise. He is wrong though to regard this redescription as if it
were intended as an unmasking of theory’s latent idealism. According to
Jameson, my characterization of Husserl’s epoche as a spiritual exercise is
I A N H U N T E R is an Autralian Professorial Fellow in the Centre for the History
of European Discourses at the University of Queensland. He is the author of
Rival Enlightenments (2002) and The Secularisation of the Confessional State
(2007). His current project, on the historical emergence of poststructuralist
theory, issued in a preliminary study of “The History of Theory” in these pages,
which gave rise to the present exchange of views.
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intended to make it not only serve as “the badge of the idealism of theorists
and philosophers from Plotinus to Kant and down to our time, but also
more generally to reveal behind it the conspiratorial program of religion as
such and of Nietzsche’s evil ascetic priests” (p. 566). For Jameson, “The
History of Theory” also implies “an indictment of the intellectual as such,
which is the burden of the assimilation of theory to a ‘spiritual exercise’
and of the unmasking of theoretical analysis and interpretation as an ide-
alism and indeed an asceticism of a quasi-religious type” (p. 567). This
forms part of Jameson’s larger argument that this supposed expose´ of
theory’s idealism is not so much wrong as half-baked—stranded by its own
incapacity to comprehend theoretical idealism as the ideological expres-
sion of late capitalist production relations—and thus condemned to oscil-
late between its own unacknowledged idealist premises and a flat-footed
positivism. Jameson unfavorably compares this intransitive oscillation
with the genuine dialectical reconciliation of ideality and materiality
achieved in the properly theoretical “critique of aesthetics.”1 This is a
critique that uncovers the true material-political foundation of aesthetic
spiritual exercises in the form of their alliance with “anti-Left status quo
politics, in this country anti-antiglobalization and in France democratic
and parliamentary propaganda of the type embodied by Luc Ferry” (p.
568).
Jameson misunderstands the point of redescribing theory in terms of
the deployment of a certain kind of spiritual exercise when he runs to-
gether two very different levels of analysis, both of which are present, but
not conjoined, in the essay. There is a methodological use of the concept of
spiritual exercises—modes of intellectual self-transformation and self-cul-
tivation—as part of a program for treating forms of thought as activities
open to historical description (compare also speech acts, languages of
thought, arts of thinking). Then there is the substantive use of the concept
in this particular case to redescribe Husserl’s transcendental reduction as a
highly specialized spiritual exercise— one that allows its practitioners to
withdraw from formal-positive knowledges and quotidian values in prep-
aration for an encounter with a renovatory, pure phenomenon.
It should be clear that, methodologically speaking, to ascribe a spiritual
exercise to a thinker or style of thought is in no sense to convict them of the
philosophical sin of idealism. The notion of spiritual exercise is simply a
1. At the risk of waking the dead and making them do battle again, it can be noted that I
offered a discussion of this set of issues in Hunter, “Aesthetics and Cultural Studies,” in
Cultural Studies, ed. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler (New York,
1992), pp. 347–67, to which Jameson responded inter alia in Fredric Jameson, “On ‘Cultural
Studies,’” Social Text, no. 34 (1993): 17–52.
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way of characterizing an array of acts of inner self-transformation— of
work on the self by the self—aimed at forming personae suited to an open-
ended variety of ethical aspirations, “psychological” deportments, cogni-
tive dispositions, public duties, and private desires.2 These exercises are not
themselves reducible to ideas. They draw from a repertory of techne and
practices—timetables, architectures and spatial organizations, practices of
meditation and self-scrutiny, skeptical exercises of various kinds, and a
whole variety of discursive rhetorics—whose mode of existence is that of
historically instituted arts of the self. Moreover, while some of these exer-
cises are indeed oriented to purifying an intellect to make it capable of
acceding to pure ideas,3 others are oriented to such distinctly nonidealist
purposes as purging religious passions from judicial judgment;4 culti-
vating the personae required for the holding of various public offices;5
forming the Baconian disposition capable of openness to experimentally
generated phenomena;6 and so on.
As for my substantive application of the concept to Husserl’s transcen-
dental reduction, I have no interest in characterizing the latter as idealist—
that’s Jameson’s term of heretication, not mine—let alone of treating it as
the “badge of the idealism of theorists and philosophers from Plotinus to
Kant and down to our time” (p. 566). Setting aside my comments on the
anti-Kantian dimension of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology,7
Husserl’s construction of the transcendental phenomenon as something
like the breakthrough appearance of Kant’s noumenon would normally
have him classified as a transcendental realist rather than a Kantian
transcendental idealist, although I am not interested in this kind of philo-
sophical taxonomy either. What is interesting and significant about the
transcendental reduction from the viewpoint of intellectual historiogra-
2. For overviews, see Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from
Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford, 1995), and Michel Foucault, The
Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Colle`ge de France 1981–1982, trans. Graham Burchell,
ed. Fre´de´ric Gros (New York, 2006).
3. See Hadot, Plotinus, or The Simplicity of Vision, trans. Chase (Chicago, 1993), and
Hunter, “The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant’s Groundwork as Intellectual Paideia,” Critical
Inquiry 28 (Summer 2002): 908–29.
4. See David Saunders, “The Judicial Persona in Historical Context: The Case of Matthew
Hale,” in The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity, ed. Conal
Condren, Stephen Gaukroger, and Hunter (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 140–59.
5. See Condren, “The Persona of the Philosopher and the Rhetorics of Office in Early
Modern England” and Robert von Friedeburg, “Persona and Office: Althusius on the
Formation of Magistrates and Councillors,” in The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe, pp.
66–89, 160–81.
6. See Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy
(Cambridge, 2001).
7. See Hunter, “The History of Theory,” pp. 95, 99.
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phy is not its doctrinal error or truth but its use as a means of intellectual
self-transformation by those who master it in order to change their cogni-
tive and moral disposition. The activity of skeptical suspension or “brack-
eting” of the philosopher’s prior cognitive and moral attachments is just
that: a concrete activity, a practice of withdrawal from all “factual sci-
ences,” formal structures, and practical values. This is undertaken in ac-
cordance with the ethical aspiration to cleanse the consciousness of every-
thing that might block the breakthrough appearance of a phenomenon
unsullied by the existing disposition of a natural self to its quotidian world
life. The epoche is not a philosophical mistake but an existential practice.
For the purposes of the essay, the point of redescribing the transcen-
dental reduction in this way is not to engage with Husserl’s philosophy as
such, let alone to denounce it as idealism. Rather, it is to identify the source
of a spiritual exercise that, just because it is a means of cultivating a par-
ticular intellectual disposition or persona, is capable of migrating to other
(extraphilosophical) fields of knowledge, carrying its problematizing
power with it. The central historical argument of the essay is that post-
structuralist theorizing arose from this process of migration, problemati-
zation, and colonization. It thus emerged in a variety of forms, depending
on the disciplinary field targeted as the fossilized carapace that had to be
shattered in order to admit a renovatory engagement with the so-called
other. These forms included Althusser’s suspension of humanist values
and positivist political economy as a means of allowing a renovated Marx-
ism to break through in the form of an answer to a question not yet asked.
A further instance is supplied by Julia Kristeva’s identification of a claustral
symbolic level of poetic language underpinned by the pulsing energies and
flows of a semiotic chora, whose containment permits signification and
whose irruptive breakthroughs grant ecstasy. We also provided the exam-
ple of a poststructuralist literary criticism—part Marxist, part phenome-
nological—that alighted on a preexisting New Criticism and performed
the same set of (self-) problematizing operations: declaring this criticism
to be closed to flows of meaning coursing beneath texts and opaque to the
forms of literary production making them possible, thus ripe for the pos-
sibility of various kinds of revolutionary irruption and breakthrough.
(Here we can indulge in a minor point of correction by noting that in this
discussion of criticism it is not theory that is traced back to the Protestant
“seminar of conscience”—as Jameson misparaphrases [p. 569]— but a
particular kind of antitheoretical literary criticism personified in the Leavis
school.)8
8. See Hunter, “The History of Theory,” pp. 104–5.
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The essay presents these examples as claimed instances of a historical
development in which poststructuralist theorizing emerged from the mi-
gration of the exercise of the epoche into an array of adjacent humanities
disciplines on which it could work its problematizing powers. Needless to
say, my academic vanity would be seriously wounded were Jameson or
anyone else to show that the apparently common structure of the array of
theoretical discourses did not arise from this migration of the phenome-
nological exercise and intellectual persona and that it came from quite
other sources. Nonetheless, such disconfirmation would confirm what I
take my account to be: a historical hypothesis about the emergence of a
particular art of the self-as-theorist that is indeed susceptible to “further
research,” rather than a faintly sinister cover for an antitheory ideological
hatchet job.
2
Jameson’s reading of “The History of Theory” as a half-baked debunk-
ing of intellectuals as such—rather than as a historical characterization of
a particular intellectual persona—is tied to his assumption that the point
of the essay is to expose the idealism of theory. If the essay is uninterested
in exposing idealism, however, then neither does it offer an account of
intellectuals in general. The whole point of approaching forms of thought
as activities or disciplined ensembles of arts—arts of calculation and think-
ing, rhetorics of persuasion and demonstration, techniques of observation
and experiment, exercises in self-transformation and self-cultivation—is
to constitute as a topic for historical investigation the multiple ways in
which human beings have used their intellect. Among these ways, the uses
associated with philosophical idealism—for example, the constitution of
the intellect as an immaterial substance whose purification permits it to
participate in the thinking or willing of pure ideas—are indeed an impor-
tant topic of investigation within the history of university metaphysics.9 So
too, though, are the uses associated with the formation of a variety of other
intellectual personae, such as those mentioned above: the deconfessional-
ized juridical persona; the intellect and will groomed for the holding of
magisterial office; and the Baconian intellect cultivated for its reception of
experimentally generated phenomena and its disinterest in Aristotelian
9. See, for examples, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, “Metaphysik [Leibniz],” in Die
Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, ed. Helmut Holzhey, Schmidt-Biggemann, and Jean-Pierre
Schobinger, 4 vols. (Basel, 1998–2001), 4:1064–79; Walter Sparn, “Kant’s Doctrine of
Atonement as a Theory of Subjectivity,” in Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip
J. Rossi and Michael Wreen (Bloomington, Ind., 1991), pp. 103–12; and Hunter, “The Morals of
Metaphysics.”
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essences and system. It is misguided and misleading to unify such diverse
deployments of arts of reasoning as so many expressions of reason in gen-
eral, least of all by putting them in a general relation of (mis)recognition to
a level of social materiality that supposedly makes them all possible.
Applied to the history of philosophy more narrowly, my approach to
intellectual history leads to what might be called a regionalization of phi-
losophy and the philosopher. It treats what counts as philosophy and what
it means to be a philosopher as something varying with the deployment of
arts of thinking valorized as philosophical within a particular historical
context or cultural region.10 In Europe and America the immediate context
for the cultivation of the philosophical arts and persona has typically been
the university, which, because of the attachment of these arts to religiously
fractured political entities, has resulted in a regional or geo-intellectual
distribution of philosophical styles. This, to take one of the more obvious
instances, is the reality lying behind the ascription of the geo-intellectual
term continental philosophy to European transcendental phenomenology.
Needless to say, this approach to philosophy via its regional self-
understandings and styles of cultivation is radically opposed to and by
those approaches that view philosophy as the form in which a universal
human reason becomes conscious of its own structure and operation. It
does not matter whether this reason is thought of as something to which
philosophy accedes through an exemplary act of intellectual reflexivi-
ty—as in Descartes’s meditative recovery of first principles— or as some-
thing with which philosophy has a historical rendezvous as the result of
reason’s (Hegelian or Marxian) evolution towards the moment at which it
becomes conscious of itself.
Jameson can ascribe a half-baked theory of intellectuals to “The History
of Theory” only because he imagines himself in possession of a fully
cooked one. On this classic Marxist account, intellectuals are determined
by their anomalous position in the relations of production, which sees
them stranded between the productive class they have left behind and the
ruling elite that refuses them full admittance (see p. 570). According to this
model—which Jameson applies not just to “Hunter” but also to E. P.
Thompson, Richard Rorty, and, in a long excursus, Pierre Bourdieu—it is
their interstitial class position that both permits intellectuals to see
through the idealist ideology of the bourgeoisie and prevents them from
reflexively grounding their own thought in the level of material produc-
10. On this, see Schobinger, foreword, and Holzhey, “Der Philosoph im 17. Jahrhundert,”
Die Philosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts, 1:xxxix–lvi, 1:3–30; and Condren, Gaukroger, and Hunter,
“Introduction,” The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe, pp. 1–16. See also Philosophie und
Regionalita¨t, ed. Karol Bal, Volker Caysa, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (Wroclaw, 1999).
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tion from which they have been deracinated. The poor things can’t help
being intellectual renegades of late capitalism; they have been born into a
time when the relations of production have not yet driven human reason
to its rendezvous with self-consciousness in the mind of a universal class. It
can be scarcely their fault then that they are condemned to oscillate be-
tween a barren empiricism and their own unacknowledged idealism, fi-
nally falling into an antitheoretical positivism whose real agenda is the
destruction of Marxism on behalf of the state and big business. Yet Jame-
son finds it in his heart to blame them nonetheless.
In the essay, I engage this set of issues only via a brief discussion of Terry
Eagleton’s elaboration of the Marxist model within the idiom of culture
and cultural studies.11 In Eagleton’s own foray into the history of theory it
is theory itself that is symptomatic of human reason’s historical unripe-
ness; the integration of culture within the productive machinery of late
capitalism both provides intellectuals with heightened theoretical insight
into culture and blocks access to its material conditions, leaving its theo-
rists confined to formalism, idealism, and relativism. (Another small cor-
rection: it is not me but Eagleton who accuses Rorty of relativism, in the
throes of his nostalgia for the good old days of Leninism and Aristotelian-
ism.) The point of identifying this pattern of thought in Eagleton is not to
single out Marxism for attack. On the contrary, it is to treat Eagleton’s
elaboration of it as one among the larger array of theoretical discourses
formed via the philosophical colonization of various fields of knowledge. It
was to this end that I cited Foucault’s genealogy (from The Order of Things)
according to which the human sciences emerged from a Kantian interro-
gation of the positive sciences that asks how consciousness can emerge
from the otherwise material structures of language, life, and labor.12 Rather
than viewing it as part of an episteme or virtual discursive structure from
which historical theoretical discourses emerge—thereby following Fou-
cault to the letter—I treat this kind of interrogation in a different way: as a
contingent act of intellectual problematization carried out in fields of
knowledge via the cultivation of a certain kind of intellectual disposition
towards the objects of those fields. This is what makes it possible to treat
such aporia as that between transcendental consciousness and empirical
being— or that between the idealism of reason and the materiality of its
social production—as themselves voluntary modes of intellectual prob-
lematization associated with the cultivation of a certain kind of intellectual
persona. Such is the persona who feels compelled by the nontransparency
11. See Hunter, “The History of Theory,” pp. 79, 85–86, 93.
12. See ibid., pp. 89, 93–94.
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of reason to its own material or historical conditions to suspend the given
objects of reason (ideology) and seek for these conditions. They are located
in the far utopian distance, at the end of the protracted dialectical recon-
ciliation of the ideal and the material, in the historical moment when
consciousness finally becomes reflexive to its own material conditions or
else fails to do so owing to the tragic unripeness of history.
3
Jameson rightly regards my treatment of dialectical philosophical his-
tory—as the instrument of a voluntary (or pedagogically imposed) prac-
tice of intellectual self-problematization and grooming—as the point of
maximum difference between our respective historiographies (see p. 572).
In fact, faced with the unexpected and unwelcome thought that the arte-
factual character of man as an “empirico-transcendental doublet” might
transform the divisions of the dialectic into instruments of a regional in-
tellectual regimen, Jameson reacts with Ptolemaic incredulity and a sud-
den recourse to the transhistorical, neurobiological, and finally universal
structure of thought and reality:
Doublet indeed! Have we really solved this problem, which runs from
the mind/body dilemma through Cartesian and Spinozan dualisms all
the way down to base and superstructure if not the mechanical-
materialist mirage of the cognitive brain itself? The traces of this
metaphysical raw nerve are to be found in all the dualisms in human
history. . . . The only truly original solution, which does not claim to
resolve anything but rather to incorporate the dilemma of opposi-
tions and binaries into its very structure and method, remains the
dialectic, which posits a permanent gap between subject and object
within all our thoughts as well as in reality itself (herein lies its kin-
ship with Lacanian analysis as well as its foundational and inextricable
relationship with Marxism itself). [Pp. 574–75]
The issue of course is not whether this problem has been solved but how it
has been created, and continuously re-created, as the instrument of a long-
standing art of intellectual self-problematization and transformation. In
order to put the brakes on Jameson’s headlong descent from the Cartesian
and Spinozan dualisms through the brain and out into the universal struc-
ture of thought—and in order to indicate the history and pertinence of a
nondialectical historiography—we can observe that even at their initial
appearance there was a historiography that treated these dualisms as vol-
untary assumptions of a particular philosophical culture. Drawing on his
father Jacob’s historiography of philosophy and theology, the early mod-
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ern political jurist Christian Thomasius thus listed the following set of
doctrines as historical sources of “sectarian philosophy” and most of the
philosophical sects:
These doctrines are: (1) that God and matter were two coeternal prin-
ciples; (2) that God’s nature consists in speculation and thought; (3)
that the nature of spirits consists in thought; (4) that the nature of
man consists in reason [Verstand] and that on its perfection depends
the happiness of the whole human race; (5) that man is a single spe-
cies and that what is good for one [person] is good for another; (6)
that the human will is improved through the reason; (7) and that in
this way—that is, through the improvement of thought—it is very
easy to attain wisdom and virtue.13
According to this historiography, the dualism of thought and matter arose
from the Greek philosophical distinctions between form and chaos, intel-
lection and prime matter. This gave rise to the fundamental doctrine of
metaphysics—that the meaning of the world (being) is the product of the
forms in which it is intelligized—and also to the basic forms of dualistic
and monistic metaphysics, such as those found in Descartes and Spinoza.
Dualistic metaphysics was thus subject to a certain kind of historical prob-
lematization in part through its incompatibility with the radical monism
of Christian ex nihilo creation, which allowed Greek philosophy to be
treated as the intrusion of an alien pagan culture, but also through the
latest techniques of humanist critical philology, which allowed the new
historians (Jacob Thomasius, Isaac de Beausobre, and Johann Lorenz
Mosheim) to expose the anachronisms by which the church fathers had
fabricated apostolic origins for Neoplatonic and neo-Aristotelian meta-
physics.14
Needless to say, it is my intention not to endorse the account of the
relation between Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine found in this
historiography—for this we can turn to the remarkable studies of Peter
13. Christian Thomasius, Cautelen zur Erlernung der Rechtsgelehrtheit, vol. 20 of
Ausgewa¨hlte Werke, ed. Werner Schneiders (1713; Hildesheim, 2006), p. 113.
14. For more on this, see Ralph Ha¨fner, “Jacob Thomasius und die Geschichte der
Ha¨resien,” in Christian Thomasius (1655–1728): Neue Forschungen im Kontext der
Fru¨haufkla¨rung, ed. Friedrich Vollhardt (Tu¨bingen, 1997), pp. 141–64 and “Das
Erknenntnisproblem in der Philologie um 1700: Zum Verha¨ltnis von Polymathie und Aporetik
bei Jacob Friedrich Reimmann, Christian Thomasius, und Johann Albert Fabricius,” in
Philologie und Erkenntnis: Beitra¨ge zu Begriff und Problem fru¨hneuzeitlicher “Philologie,” ed.
Ha¨fner (Tu¨bingen, 2001), pp. 95–128; and Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State:
The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 61–73.
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Brown and J. G. A. Pocock15— but to clarify what happened to metaphysics
when it was first historicized. In removing Greek philosophy from Chris-
tian truth, the early modern historiography of philosophy also removed it
from the sacred history in which that truth would be realized in time with
the second coming of Christ. Greek philosophy was thus relocated in a
purely profane or pagan temporality in which history did not represent the
temporal unfolding of transcendent ideas but consisted wholly and solely
of human activities and their consequences, particularly their civil conse-
quences. (With the shrinking of eschatology, this profane temporality
could later stake a claim to be history as such.) This protocontextual his-
toriography thus suspended the truth-claims of metaphysics by viewing it
as (what we would call) a concrete historical activity, typically in terms of
the teaching activities of the ancient or modern schools. It thus opened a
space in which philosophy could be described in terms of its effects, in the
first instance, on the personalities of its practitioners and then, second, on
civil society.
The philosophical dualisms that Jameson ascribes to the structure of
human thought, and thence to the dialectical motor of history, have thus
long been viewed as contingent scholastic teachings by a nondialectical
historiography. This nondialectical historiography was indeed driven by a
combative cultural-political agenda. It was fashioned to undermine the
claims of metaphysics to offer a philosophical or “natural” explication of
Christian theology, which, in the era of ecclesial fragmentation, had given
rise to rival philosophical theologies whose conflicts were incapable of
resolution and yet a powerful source of intolerance and persecution. This
contextualizing historiography may thus itself be treated as the instrument
of a particular kind of spiritual exercise, a means of suspending the non-
negotiable truth-claims of transcendent philosophies by historicizing
them. Its aim is the grooming of a persona capable of grasping philoso-
phies in a detached and relativistic spirit, as just so many teachings of the
sects and schools. It is no accident then that Thomasius insisted on includ-
ing this historiography of philosophy in the training of his law students; he
regarded it as the key means of allowing them to detach themselves from
their own metaphysical and confessional commitments and to view the
law in a deconfessionalized manner.
Despite its combative and programmatic motivation and its evident
“regionality,” however, we should not assume that this antimetaphysical
15. See Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early
Christianity (New York, 1988) and Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the
Roman World (Cambridge, 1995); and the first three volumes of J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and
Religion, 4 vols. to date (Cambridge, 1999–2005).
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historiography is incapable of descriptive neutrality. Needless to say, this
neutrality is not founded in any kind of transcendental objectivity. It finds
its grounds only in the contingent capacity to withdraw from irreconcil-
ably conflictual transcendent philosophies and to relocate them within a
noneschatological temporality, where they are viewed in terms of their
personal and civil effects. It is not the case that in claiming a capacity for
true (falsifiable) description this historiography “finds itself fatally ratio-
nalizing its own disciplinary position as a place of truth . . . which surely
betrays a philosophical commitment to system rather than a theoretical
refusal of it” (p. 575). The point of the exercise is not to proclaim a new
philosophical truth but to transform the intellectual disposition in which
such truth will be acceded to, from apodictic to fallibilistic, as we shall
discuss below. The antimetaphysical historiography thus does not itself
claim to be yet another recovery of human reason that sweeps the entire
cultural field into modernity, only to be a combat-discipline making avail-
able a particular capacity for metaphysically neutral historical description.
Its “foundations” lie not in the kind of knowledge to which it gives rise, but
in the forms of sectarian adherence that it was designed to overcome. This
is why it remains intrinsically contestable, especially by those who have
been disposed to seek for a true metaphysical foundation for knowledge, as
can be seen from the present exchange.
4
I have suggested elsewhere that Cambridge school intellectual history
might be regarded as a modern inheritor of this early modern antimeta-
physical historiography of philosophy.16 This applies especially to that
school’s insistence on treating forms of thought as activities—speech
acts—thereby suspending their truth-claims and seeking to interpret them
in terms of what discourses do in a particular historical context.17 For
Jameson, in lacking a proper historical ontology, this kind of historiogra-
phy is forced to give primacy to local interests and to conflicts lacking any
overarching order or direction, thereby reducing history to a vast conspir-
acy theory, a triumph of “cynical reason” (p. 580). In this regard, Jameson’s
critique of my adaptation of Cambridge school historiography converges
uncannily with Charles Taylor’s critique of the primacy of conflict in
16. See Hunter, “The History of Philosophy and the Persona of the Philosopher,” Modern
Intellectual History 4 (Nov. 2007): 591–92.
17. See Quentin Skinner, “Interpretation, Rationality, and Truth,” Visions of Politics, 3 vols.
(Cambridge, 2002), 1:27–56.
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Quentin Skinner’s contextual hermeneutics.18 Despite the fact that they
appeal to different historical ontologies—Taylor to a neo-Thomist ontol-
ogy of natural law, Jameson to a neo-Marxist ontology of production re-
lations—they agree in insisting that discursive truth must be grounded in
man’s historical becoming rather than tied to the outcomes of entirely
contingent battles over what he should be. Neither thinker considers the
possibility that the modern capacity to treat forms of thought as instru-
ments of conflicting cultural interests might itself have been the prize of a
partially successful historical battle: that waged by the antimetaphysical
historiographers against the early modern moral ontologists, including of
course the Thomists. The instrument and outcome of that battle is a his-
toriography that views history not in terms of laws governing what we
must become but in terms of contingencies that make us what we happen
to be.
In order to evoke his moral or political ontology of history, Jameson
returns to the source, citing Marx’s famous dictum: “Morality, religion,
metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of conscious-
ness corresponding to these” arise from the fact that “men, developing
their material production and their material intercourse, alter . . . also
their thinking and the products of their thinking. It is not consciousness
that determines life, but life that determines consciousness” (p. 573). Ap-
parently the old verses still scan, as Jameson uses them to determine the
partially successful dimension of “The History of Theory”—its own puta-
tive “sociology of ideas”—as well as its apparent fundamental failure: its
incapacity to ground this sociology in anything other than academic scrap-
ping. In discussing the rise of theory in terms of “cultural-political battles
in the humanities academy,” the author of this essay cannot answer the
question, “battles for what?” as he lacks the historical ontology that would
allow him to understand these battles for “social prestige” in terms of the
“will to climb higher on the ladder of social class” (p. 577).
On the one hand, this hapless author should not be blamed for this; the
intellectualizing of “material production” associated with “late capitalism”
prevents intellectuals from having an organic Gramscian relation to the
productive classes. This leaves intellectuals organic only to the university,
from which they try to break via an impotent anti-intellectualist ideology
that fails to penetrate the late-capitalist materiality that it serves. On the
other hand, such intellectuals are to be blamed for this anti-intellectualist
polemic, “carried like a virus within the attacks on theory,” because its
18. See Charles Taylor, “The Hermeneutics of Conflict,” in Meaning and Context: Quentin
Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton, N.J., 1988), pp. 218–28.
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disengagement from the progressive motor of history turns them into “objec-
tive traitors,” the unwitting agents of an “essentially probusiness agenda” that
is driving the privatization of universities, reducing the critical potential of
humanities theory, undermining academic Marxism, and even playing to the
populist and anarchist sympathies of today’s “younger intellectuals” (p. 569).
The putative anti-intellectualism of empirical historiography is thus an unin-
telligent political strategy in America, although this might not be understood
by provincials hailing from what Jameson quaintly calls “commonwealth
countries” with social democratic traditions.
What would make us think, though, that morality, religion, and meta-
physics arise from the forms of “material production,” that “life deter-
mines consciousness,” or, conversely, that “consciousness determines
life”? I don’t mean this as a rhetorical question. I mean: how has it come
about that a certain kind of intellectual should be driven to assert that the
entirety of culture and politics arises from the forms in which men struggle
to become conscious of the materiality that determines their conscious-
ness? After all, is it plausible to suggest that the assertion “life determines
consciousness” (or “consciousness determines life”) is a statement capable
of being verified (or falsified) in some particular discipline on the basis of
some scannable array of evidence? The statements’ insusceptibility to (dis)
confirmation does not make them meaningless, however; it is only a
prompt to force us to look for the register in which their meaning and
significance resides. In this way we withdraw from the battles to verify and
falsify these statements—the remorseless quarrels between materialism
and idealism—and turn them into objects of a historiographic inquiry into
what it is that is done by the making of these statements. How did it come
about that intellectuals of a certain kind began to define themselves in
terms of the problem of winning consciousness from its material condi-
tions, and what has been at stake in their doing so?
In “The History of Theory” I suggest that Foucault’s “archaeology of the
human sciences” begins to answer this question by providing an account
of the historical emergence of the problem, treating it as the outcome of a
Kantian interrogation of the category of labor that converts production
relations into conditions of consciousness. I also suggest that Foucault’s
account needs to be supplemented and transformed in two ways: first, by
an account of the Kantian interrogation that treats it as grounded in a
spiritual exercise designed to transform the individual’s mode of acceding
to truth (much in the manner we have outlined for Husserl’s epoche)19 and,
19. For some relevant arguments, see Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 274–316 and “The Morals of
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second, by an account of Kantianism as a “regional” combat-metaphysics
originating in Protestant northern Europe and operative at the level of
academic problematization, “entrism,” and colonization.20 Along with
several other scholars I have developed these arguments in other studies
and will not attempt to rehearse them here, only their consequence for our
present concern: if the interest of 1960s humanities theorists in recovering
consciousness from its material conditions arose from the Kantian prob-
lematization of an array of positive knowledges, then this needs to be
investigated in terms of the particular intellectual disposition formed by
Kantian philosophy and by the cultural combat for which this philosophy
was fashioned.
One of the lesser known but (in the event) crucial fronts on which Kant
honed his intellectual weaponry was that of historiography. In his Reflex-
ionen on the history of metaphysics, Kant formulates the need for what he
calls a “philosophical history of philosophy” in order to combat the pre-
vailing Geschichte der Gelehrsamkeit, the history of learning or erudition.21
In fact the history of learning was the eighteenth-century form of the early
modern antimetaphysical historiography of philosophy discussed above.22
In attacking this historiography for reducing philosophy to a series of
“facts” occurring in time, Kant renewed the earlier metaphysical concep-
tion of history as the medium in which transcendent reason unfolds itself
in the temporal register, which means that the history of philosophy must
Metaphysics”; George di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors:
The Vocation of Humankind, 1774–1800 (Cambridge, 2005); and Sparn, “Kant’s Doctrine of
Atonement as a Theory of Subjectivity.”
20. We gain some sense of the geo-intellectual regionality of Kantianism not just from the
placing of several of his works on the Catholic Index during the nineteenth century but more
generally from the neo-Thomist attack on the formative consequences of Kantian spirituality.
This lasts into the present in the work of Alisdair MacIntyre and the “communitarians,” but
also more formally, for example, in De´sire´ Mercier, “The Two Critiques of Kant,” Cardinal
Mercier’s Philosophical Essays: A Study in Neo-Thomism, trans. and ed. David A. Boileau
(Herent, Belgium, 2002), pp. 137–50. For important pointers to the manner in which Kantians
entered and conquered the law, philosophy, and theology faculties of the University of Jena, see
Der Aufbruch in den Kantianismus: Der Fru¨hkantianismus an der Universita¨t Jena von 1785–1800
und seine Vorgeschichte, ed. Norbert Hinske, Erhard Lange, and Horst Schro¨pfer (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt, 1995).
21. See Immanuel Kant, “Lose Bla¨tter zu den Fortschritten der Metaphysik,” Kants
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Deusche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin et al., 29 vols.
(Berlin, 1902–1980), 20:341–43.
22. See Frank Grunert, “Die Pragmatisierung der Gelehrsamkeit: Zum
Gelehrsamkeitskonzept von Christian Thomasius und im Thomasianismus,” in Kultur der
Kommunikation: Die europa¨ische Gelehrtenrepublik im Zeitalter von Leibniz und Lessing, ed.
Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Wiesbaden, 2005), pp. 131–53.
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be an account of reason’s coming to consciousness of itself.23 This was the
historical circumstance in which Kant invented dialectical philosophical
history. If reason could not have direct access to its objects— owing to the
recessive character of the noumenal thing in itself—then it could nonethe-
less progress towards this impossible moment, driven by the inevitable
conflict between its tendency to identify the noumenon with ideas (ratio-
nalism) or with sensory experience (empiricism). It only took Hegel to
transpose this dialectic into the history of human institutions (preemi-
nently the state) and Marx to ground it in a philosophical anthropology of
labor for us to arrive at Jameson’s conception of history as the dialectical
struggle to recover consciousness from its material conditions of possibil-
ity.
5
We have already noted that in combating university metaphysics, the
nondialectical historiography of philosophy targeted the sectarian dispo-
sition that metaphysics was held to form. According to Thomasius, this
disposition arises from the fact that metaphysics posits a single source of
intelligibility for the world—in the form of the transcendent ideas or forms
that shape its materiality—which means that in principle there is a single
true way of acceding to these ideas and a single master or school to be
followed.24 Further, because knowledge of intelligible being is thought of as
mediated by a privileged part of man’s own being— his intellect or rea-
son—those who fail to accede to being in the correct way are not just
making a cognitive mistake; they are failing to realize that part of their
being that makes them human and are thus betraying the vocation of
humanity. Metaphysics thus fosters sectarian contempt for those regarded
as falling away from the true path.
The antimetaphysical historiography of philosophy sought to deal with
this problem via two convergent strategies: it used fideism and skepticism
to deny that there is a single transcendent source of intelligibility for the
world, and it denied that man’s knowledge of the world arose from his
rational being. It treated knowledge instead as the inherently fallibilistic
product of the historical (empirical) and philosophical (ratiocinative)
disciplines through which man worked up information delivered by his
senses.25 Thomasius was almost completely ignorant of the new
seventeenth-century natural philosophy, but he knew enough to treat its
23. For a historical discussion of this moment, albeit one written from inside the fishbowl,
see Lucien Braun, Geschichte der Philosophiegeschichte, trans. Franz Wimmer (Darmstadt, 1990).
24. See Thomasius, Cautelen zur Erlernung der Rechtsgelehrtheit, chaps. 1, 6, and 12.
25. See ibid., chap. 5.
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experimental character as a further contribution to the “fallibilization”
and pluralization of knowledge, as it too was a means of blocking attempts
to deduce knowledge from transcendent concepts and systems. The point
of this “eclectic” reconstruction of knowledge was that there should be no
single way of acceding to truth that might form the basis of a compulsive or
sectarian philosophy and no rational humanity from which those who
failed or refused to accede to this truth might be excluded as moral rene-
gades.26
Seen from this perspective, a central problem with the Marxist meta-
physics informing Jameson’s response is that it reinvests truth in being.
Intelligible being has shifted its locus of course—from an intellectually
informed materiality to a materially formed intellect—yet continues to be
presented as the single path to a metropolitan truth, namely, the dialectical
path that must be followed if consciousness is to recover knowledge of its
own material determination. The sectarianism accompanying this mate-
rialist metaphysics is clear enough in Jameson’s treatment of those who do
not follow this path—the apostates of antitheory—as not just academic
duffers but political and moral renegades who betray humanity’s path to
self-consciousness on behalf of big business and its governments. This is a
pointer to a threatening tendency in Marxist theorizing of this kind,
namely, the will to tie politics to its metaphysics of the recovery of con-
sciousness from the historical realization of man’s social being. Not only
does this mean that the political order is envisaged as the instrument of
man’s social recovery of his true form—thereby returning politics to its
confessional role as the instrument of a true metaphysics— but it makes
those who do not accept this metaphysics into political traitors. In requir-
ing intellectuals to be better than they could be, Marxist metaphysics ends
by making them worse than they are.
The detranscendentalizing of knowledge effected by early modern
antimetaphysical historiography went together with a striking seculariza-
tion of politics. If the truth of man’s moral being lies beyond fallible knowl-
edge and if man can govern his conduct in civil society without access to
such truth, then the state has no capacity or right to enforce it.27 In fact it
should get out of the truth business altogether and confine itself to provi-
sion of social peace through the governance of external conduct. The
proper attitude of the state towards the rival metaphysical teachings and
26. See Ulrich Johannes Schneider, “Eclecticism and the History of Philosophy,” in History
and the Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, ed. Donald R.
Kelley (Rochester, N.Y., 1997), pp. 83–101, and Horst Dreitzel, “Zur Entwicklung und Eigenart
der ‘Eklektischen Philosophie,’” Zeitschrift fu¨r Historische Forschung 18, no. 3 (1991): 281–343.
27. See Hunter, The Secularisation of the Confessional State, chaps. 4 and 5.
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moral communities that it houses is to tolerate them all—to the extent that
they renounce mutual persecution—which means that the state must not
itself attempt to enforce a metaphysical ideology.
In observing that some modern states have indeed imposed Marxism as
a repressive ideology with a view to realizing man’s true being and con-
sciousness, it would be extravagant and misleading to treat Jameson as
some kind of apologist for these modern versions of the confessional state.
In fact it would be almost as extravagant and misleading as it is of him to
treat me as an anti-intellectual stooge for a malign probusiness agenda that
is blocking humanity’s passage to its utopian future. Context is everything,
and Jameson and I live in states that insist on tolerating both our positions,
within the limits already mentioned. That said, there is something that
Marxist theory shares with other confessional metaphysics that makes it
available for use as a repressive state ideology, namely, its teaching that the
theory itself is the single path by which man can accede to his true being
and that if politics is to facilitate this accession then it must aim at some-
thing higher than ensuring civil peace and flourishing for rival moral or
ideological communities.
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